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WHEN CONSTITUTIONS COLLIDE: A STUDY IN
FEDERALISM IN THE CRIMINAL LAW CONTEXT
Michael R. Braudest

I.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States that
apply to criminal cases have cognate provisions in the constitutions of
the various states - provisions that create the same right or restriction.
Often the language of the state provisions is quite similar to that of the
parallel federal provision. When the Supreme Court of the United States
interprets a provision of the federal charter in a manner that conflicts
with state precedent, and a subsequent similar case in a state court brings
into question the proper construction of the cognate provision of the
state's constitution, the state court will be confronted with a choice between following the holding of the Supreme Court or construing the state
constitution independently. This article explores how the Court of Appeals of Maryland has resolved this dilemma, and compares its approach
with that taken by courts in other states.
The following chart sets forth important provisions of the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Rights of
the Maryland Constitution as they relate to criminal cases:
Substantive Right
or Restriction

Provision of
Maryland
Declaration of
Rights

Provision of United
States Constitution

Right to Counsel

Article 21: That in
all criminal
prosecutions, every
man hath a right
... to be allowed
counsel ....

Amendment VI: In all
criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have
the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.

Privilege against
Self-incrimination

Article 22: That
no man ought to
be compelled to
give evidence
against himself in
criminal cases.

Amendment V: No
person . . . shall be
compelled in any
criminal case to be a
witness against himself

t
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Due Process

Article 24: That
no man ought to
be taken or
imprisoned or
disseized of his
free-hold, liberties
or privileges, or
outlawed, or
exiled, or, in any
manner, destroyed,
or deprived of his
life, liberty or
property, but by
the judgment of
· his peers, or by the
Law of the land. 1

Amendment V: No
person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without
due process of law;

Searches and
Seizures

Article 26: That
all warrants,
without oath or
affirmation, to
search suspected
places, or to seize
any person or
property, are
grievous and
oppressive; and all
general warrants to
search suspected
places, or to
apprehend
suspected persons,
without naming or
describing the
place, or the
person in special,
are illegal, and
ought not to be
granted.

Amendment IV: The
right of the people to
be secure in their
persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against
unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable .
cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing
the place to be
searched, and the
persons or things to be
seized.

1. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is captioned "Due Process," and
the due process concept has long been equated with "the law of the land" under that
article. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852).

1988]
Trial by Jury
and Speedy Trial

When Constitutions Collide
Article 21: That in
all criminal
prosecutions every
man hath a right
... to a speedy
trial by an
impartial jury,
without whose
unanimous consent
he ought not to be
found guilty.
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Amendment VI: In all
criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the
State and district
wherein the crime shall
have been committed,
2

The Maryland Declaration of Rights predates the Federal Bill of
Rights by 15 years, 3 and there are obvious differences in the language of
the various cognate provisions. It is therefore not surprising that the
Maryland Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized that the Maryland
provisions, however intertwined with their federal counterparts, are "independent and separate" from the federal provisions and are "capable of
divergent effect."4 The question to be explored in this article is the extent
to which this theoretical potential has actually been realized when the
Maryland courts have been called upon to decide constitutional criminal
matters.
II.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION, AND DUE PROCESS

Perhaps the most inviting opportunity ever to come before the court
of appeals to give independent effect to the Maryland Constitution arose
in Lodowski v. State. 5 In Lodowski, two men robbed and murdered an
assistant manager of a convenience store and an off-duty police officer
who was working at the store as a security guard. 6
Several days after the murders, Lodowski became a suspect and was
taken into custody by police officers, who questioned him at length. At
first he professed his innocence, but ultimately, he orally confessed his
guilt. 7 During this phase of the interrogation, Lodowski's mother was
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI; Mo. DECL. RTS. art. 21, 22, 24, 26. This article will
not discuss the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provisions of the Maryland and
United States Constitutions.
3. The basic provisions of the Declaration of Rights appeared in the Maryland Constitution of 1776, while the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution
were enacted in 1791. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 245-46, 513 A.2d 299,
306 (1986) (Lodowski II); Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319,430 A.2d 49,53 (1981).
4. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981); see
also Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 245, 513 A.2d at 306; Lawrence v. State, 295 Md. 557,
561, 457 A.2d 1127, 1129 (1983).
.
5. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985) (Lodowski I), vacated and
remanded, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), rev'd on remand, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299
(1986).
6. /d. at 698, 490 A.2d at 1231. The victims were killed in the course of transporting
store receipts to a bank, and over $20,000 was taken. /d.
7. /d. at 712-15, 490 A.2d at 1239-40.-
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present at the police station. She was continually assured by police officers, including a colonel, that her son was being questioned only as a
witness and not as a suspect. 8 After the oral confession was obtained, the
police apparently concluded that the subterfuge was no longer necessary,
and Lodowski's mother was told that her son was now a suspect. 9
At this point, Lodowski's mother moved quickly to obtain counsel
for her son. Within an hour after learning that Lodowski was a suspect
she retained two attorneys; within another hour the attorneys were at the
police station demanding to see their client. 10
The police refused to permit the lawyers to see Lodowski, who at
that point was in the process of reducing his oral statement to writing. 11
The officers took the position that Lodowski had been informed of and
had waived his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona. 12 The attorneys sought the intercession of the local district public defender and of a
district court judge, but the police stood firm and refused to permit the
lawyers to see their client. 13 Lodowski finished writing his highly incriminatory statement and was convicted of a host of offenses including murder and robbery with a deadly weapon, and sentenced to death. 14
A unanimous court of appeals, in strong language, ruled that the
trial judge had erred in refusing to suppress the written statement. 15 Applying the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court
reasoned that a suspect's waiver of counsel cannot be knowing and voluntary if he is not told that attorneys have been retained on his behalf,
are physically present, and are available for immediate consultation. 16 In
essence, the court found that knowledge of an abstract right to counsel is
much different from being informed of the concrete presence of a specific
attorney. The court thus held "that a suspect must be fully informed of
the actual presence and availability of counsel who seeks to confer with
him, in order that any waiver of a right to counsel, as established by
Miranda, can be knowing and intelligent." 17
Shortly after Lodowski I was decided, the Supreme Court reached
8. Appellant'sBriefat 17,Lodowski/(No.l54,1983Term;No.l,l984Term)(Pretrial motion hearings record, val. 5, at 127-28).
9, Lodowski /, 302 Md. at 714, 490 A.2d at 1239.
10. /d.
11. /d.
12. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
13. Lodowski I, 302 Md. at 714, 490 A.2d 1240.
14. /d. at 698-700, 490 A.2d 1231-32.
15. /d. at 720-21, 490 A.2d at 1243. Two justices concurred, but discussed only the
victim impact statement portion of the opinion. See id. at 752-53, 490 A.2d at 1259
(Eldridge, J., concurring); id. at 753-86, 490 A.2d at 1259-77 (Cole, J., concurring).
16. /d. at 719-22, 490 A.2d at 1243-44; accord Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-86
(Del. 1983); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Jackson, 303 So. 2d 734, 737 (La. 1974); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 716-18, 335 N.E.2d 660, 691-92 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
17. Lodowski I, 302 Md. at 721, 490 A. 2d at 1243.
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the opposite conclusion in Moran v. Burbine. 18 In Burbine, the defendant
was interrogated by Rhode Island police officers who suspected him of
murder. Burbine's sister contacted the public defender's office, and an
assistant public defender telephoned the police and told them that she
would be representing Burbine if the officers intended to interrogate
him. 19 She was told that no interrogation would take place; however, the
opposite turned out to be true. Burbine waived his Miranda rights, confessed, and was convicted of murder. 20
The Supreme Court found the conduct of the police "distasteful," 21
but analyzed the waiver of counsel issue in different terms from the
Court of Appeals of Maryland. Over a strong dissent, 22 the Supreme
Court held that a waiver is valid if the will of the suspect is not overborne. 23 The Court focused upon matters that are brought to the defendant's attention, and discounted matters of which he is kept in ignorance.
Burbine was told that he had a right to a lawyer and he freely declined;
the fact that his family had already been in contact with an attorney was,
in the Court's opinion, irrelevant. 24 Significantly, however, the Court expressly permitted the states to reach a different result: "Nothing we say
today disables the States from adopting different requirements for the
conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law." 25
The State of Maryland appealed the judgment in Lodowski I to the
Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
475 u.s. 412 (1986).
Id. at 415, 416-17.
Id. at 416-18.
/d. at 424.
Id. at 434 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissent cited several
reasons for concluding that a suspect's waiver of his right to counsel is invalid when
police refuse to allow the suspect's attorney to communicate with him. First, the
dissent noted the presumption against the validity of constitutional waivers. /d. at
450-51 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Second,
the dissent argued that the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation increased the need for a strict presumption against waivers in the custodial interrogation context. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Taque v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (per curiam);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455; United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,46 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring). Finally, the dissent relied upon state court interpretations
which found that misleading police conduct vitiated constitutional waivers.
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 454-56; see, e.g., Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685 (Del. 1983);
Haliburton v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1985), vacated and remanded,
475 U.S. 1078 (1986), aff'd on remand, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987); People v.
Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189,422 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937
(1983); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 296, 450 N.E.2d 566, 571
(1983); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); see also infra
notes 42-65 and accompanying text. But see Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 423, 330
S.E.2d 575, 579 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); State v. Beck, 687
S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
23. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-24.
24. /d. at 422-23.
25. Id. at 428.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Burbine. 26 The court
of appeals, in turn, directed the parties to address themselves to the admissibility of Lodowski's confession under the United States Constitution, the Maryland Constitution, and the non-constitutional law of
Maryland. 27
The federal cmitentions were controlled by Burbine, and no convincing non-constitutional state law arguments could be mustered. 28
There were three considerations, however, which created a reasonable
hope that the defense could prevail under the state constitution. First,
the court of appeals was already on record in Lodowski I as finding the
police conduct in the case improper. 29 Second, the Supreme Court, finding such tactics distasteful, had all but invited the states to reach a result
different from Burbine. 3° Finally and most important, the court of appeals was not at all convinced by Burbine: "[W]e do not find the
[Burbine] Court's reasoning in arriving at these conclusions to be
persuasive.... " 31
Nevertheless, the court unanimously rejected the argument that the
conduct of the police was improper under article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights as denying the assistance of counsel, under article
22 as compelled self-incrimination, or under article 24 as denying due
process of law. 32 The court reasoned that however independent the
Maryland charter may be from its federal counterpart in theory, in practice decisions of the Supreme Court are virtually direct authority:
It is true that similar provisions within the Maryland and
United States Constitutions are independent and separate from
each other. Generally, however, comparable provisions of the
two constitutions are deemed to be in pari materia . . . . Here
the relevant comparable provisions of the State and Federal
Constitutions were adopted in times not far removed from each
other. The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were all
proposed by Congress on 25 September, 1789, and declared ratified on 15 December 1791. Provisions comparable to the Fifth
Amendment clauses concerning self-incrimination and due process of law and the Sixth Amendment clause concerning assistance of counsel appeared in the Declaration of Rights,
Constitution of Maryland (1776) and in each Constitution
thereafter. Thus, the concern with self-incrimination, assistance of counsel and due process of law was shared by those
26. Maryland v. Lodowski, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
27. Order of the Maryland Court of Appeals, April4, 1986, Lodowski II (No. 154, 1983
Term; No. 1, 1984 Term).
28. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 241-44, 513 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1986).
29. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
30. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428; see also supra text accompanying note 25.
31. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 242, 513 A.2d at 304.
32. /d. at 246-49, 513 A.2d 306-08.
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who framed the Federal Constitution and those who framed the
Maryland constitution. This concern on the part of the drafters
of each constitution was implanted in the same climate and
nurtured by the same hopes and fears. The provisions, so alike
in aim and content, were proposed and accepted by those anxious to preserve the freedom and rights they had so arduously
won. As stated in the preamble to the Declaration of Rights,
the provisions were prompted by the People 'grateful to Almighty God for [their] civil and religious liberty, and taking
into [their] serious consideration the best means of establishing
a good Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and
more permanent security thereof.... ' We cannot say, in the
frame of reference here, that the Federal provisions and the
State provisions are to be construed and applied differently.
This view is amply supported by what we have said in the
past. 33 ·
The court then proceeded to reject each of Lodowski's state constitutional theories on the basis of similar reasoning. With respect to compelled self-incrimination, the court concluded that under its previous
holdings the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights will be construed to
confer equivalent rights. 34 The court acknowledged that it had previously found article 22 to be "an inhibition upon the government of the
State of Maryland," 35 but found no reason to conclude that its protections of the accused "were any greater or different than the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." 36
The court next considered Lodowski's right to counsel under article
21, and dismissed the matter in a single. paragraph:
Article 21 of the Maryland· Declaration of Rights declares
'[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ...
to be allowed counsel. ... ' We stated flatly in State v. Tichnel/:
33. Id. at 245-46, 513 A.2d at 306 (citations and footnote omitted). In support of the
proposition that comparable provisions of the two constitutions are deemed to be in
pari materia, the court cited the following cases: Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431,
404 A.2d 244 (1979); Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979); State
v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699, 253 A.2d 877 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 196
A.2d 614 (1964); Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 35 A.2d 155 (1943); Blum v. State, 94
Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902). See also Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n, 278 Md. 677, 686, 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976) (article 23 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution have the same effect with regard to
the exaction of property); Rafferty v. Comptroller, 228 Md. 153, 161, 178 A.2d 896,
900 (1962) (article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution have the
same effect with regard to State income tax).
34. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 246-47, 513 A.2d at 306-07.
35. Id. at 247, 513- A.2d at 307 (quoting Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 370, 383, 35 A.2d
115, 117 (1943)).
36. Id.
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'There is no distinction between the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ... .' We again set out this view in Clark v.
State .... Accordingly, with regard to the allowance of counsel provision of Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights, we adhere to the construction the Supreme Court has placed on the
like provision of the Sixth Amendment. 37
Finally, the court rejected Lodowski's due process contention under
article 24. While recognizing that due process may provide a source for
an entitlement to counsel that would not otherwise exist, the court nevertheless found that under Burbine, any right that existed had been
waived. 38 The court reasoned that:
Under Burbine the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not operate to vitiate Burbine's waiver, and we
see nothing in Sites 39 or Rutherford 40 to compel a broader construction of the Law of the land clauses of Maryland's Declaration of Rights so as to vitiate a waiver otherwise proper. 41
In sum, the court concluded that the Maryland Constitution afforded no relief to Lowodski because the Supreme Court had found that
the cognate provisions of the United States Constitution afforded the defendant no relief.
Appellate courts in other states have viewed the matter differently.
Even before Burbine was decided, a number of state courts found that
actions by the police which prevented attorneys from consulting with
suspects in custody were repugnant to state constitutions as well as to the
federal charter. For example, in Lewis v. State, 42 the Oklahoma court
found that where a defendant was not told that his attorney had arrived
at the police station, the admission of his confession violated his right to
37. /d. (citations omitted).
38. /d. at 248-49, 513 A.2d at 307-08. The court recognized that both article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provide a right to counsel independent of the right provided
under the Sixth Amendment. /d. at 248, 513 A.2d at 307. The court also expressly
stated that "Lodowski was entitled to counsel during his custodial interrogation
resulting in his third statement." /d. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308; see also text accompanying notes 11-14. The court, however, concluded that the relevant issue was not
whether Lodowski was entitled to counsel, but rather, whether his right had been
effectively waived. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308.
39. In Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702,481 A.2d 192 (1984), the court found that as a matter
of due process an individual arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated is
entitled to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. [footnote by Author-Ed.]
40. In Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 464 A.2d 228 (1983), the court concluded that due process required a right to counsel before a defendant in a civil
contempt proceeding could be sentenced to actual incarceration. [footnote by Author-Ed.]
41. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308.
42. 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
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counsel and privilege against self-incrimination under the Oklahoma
Constitution. 43 Similarly, in State v. Haynes, 44 the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that where a suspect was removed from jail to prevent contact
with his soon-to-arrive attorney, the admission of his statement violated,
inter alia, the provisions of the Oregon Constitution condemning involuntarily-obtained statements. 45 Finally, in State v. Matthews, 4 6 it was
held that the Louisiana Constitution was violated where the police ignored a telephone request from an attorney to cease interviewing her client until she could confer with him. 47
While Burbine was pending before the Supreme Court, an interesting instance of "anticipatory federalism" confronted the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. In Dunn v. State, 48 the court was faced with an
issue identical to the issue in Burbine - whether a suspect in custody can
knowingly waive the right to counsel when, unknown to him, his wife
has arranged for an attorney to represent him but the police refuse to
permit consultation. 49 The court anticipated the possibility that it would
be called upon to "depart from the path laid down by the Supreme
Court," 50 yet it proceeded to find that under the facts there could be no
knowing and intelligent waiver. 51 In reaching this conclusion, the court
expressly relied upon both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. 52
After Burbine was decided, the departure anticipated by the Dunn
court was made by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Houston.53 In Houston, the suspect was taken into custody and questioned
about certain narcotics offenses. During the interrogation, friends of the
suspect retained an attorney. The lawyer telephoned the police station
and subsequently arrived there in an effort to consult with the suspect
before his client confessed, but was rebuffed by the officers. The suspect
confessed and was convicted. 54
Relying upon Justice Stevens' "searing and scholarly dissent" in
Burbine 55 as well as a number of state court cases 56 (ironically, including
43. /d. at 529-31 (citing with approval State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59,602 P.2d 272 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980)); see also OKLA. CONST. art. II §§ 7, 20, 21.
44. 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980).
45. /d. at 71-75, 602 P.2d 278-80; see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 12. The court also found
that the police conduct violated the defendant's federal Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. /d. at 74, 602 P.2d at 279.
46. 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982).
47. /d. at 1276-78; see also LA. CoNST. art. I,§ 13; LA. C. CR. P. art. 230, 511.
48. 696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089 (1986).
49. /d. at 567; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
50. Dunn, 696 S.W.2d at 567; see also id. at 568 n.2.
51. /d. at 569-70.
52. /d. at 570; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
53. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
54. /d. at 599-600, 724 P.2d at 1167-68, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
55. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434-68 (1986) (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-87 (Del. 1983); Haliburton v. State, 476
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Lodowski I), the court found the conduct of the officers indefensible. 57
Like the court of appeals in Lodowski II, the California court noted that
the Supreme Court had expressly permitted the states to decide the matter for themselves, and found the reasoning of Burbine unpersuasive. 58
Where the Houston court differed from the Maryland Court of Appeals
was in its approach to federalism and to the persuasiveness of Supreme
Court holdings:
By its terms, Burbine leaves the states .free to '[adopt] different requirements for the conduct of [their] employees and
officials as a matter of state law ... .' It is settled beyond debate, of course, that our state Constitution is 'a document of
independent force' ... ; unless a contrary intent is apparent, its
guarantees 'are not dependent on those [provided] by the
United States Constitution.' ...
We sit as a court of last resort on the meaning of California's Declaration of Rights. Our decisions cannot limit federal
guarantees, but restrictive federal interpretations of the United
States Constitution do not preclude a finding that the Constitution of our state accords its citizens greater individual rights
. . . . Indeed, in the federal system, state charters offer important local protection against the ebbs and flows of federal constitutional interpretation ....
We do not depart lightly from clear United States Supreme
Court rulings. The high court's decisions defining fundamental
rights and liberties are entitled to 'respectful consideration.'
But they are to be followed in California 'only where they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.' . . . In appropriate cases, we have forthrightly
rejected adherence to United States Supreme Court precedent
... even where it was necessary to overrule our own prior decision adopti~g the federal rule. 59
The court accordingly held that the conduct of the police violated
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, providing that
"[p]ersons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness
against themselves ... ,"and the separate guarantee of the same provision
So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1985), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), aff'd
on remand, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987); Davis v. State, 287 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla.
App. 1973); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189,442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (La. 1982);
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 324, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566 (1969);
Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Haynes, 288 Or.
59, 71-72, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State v.
Jones, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (Wash. App. 1978).
57. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 607-10, 724 P.2d at 1170-71, 1173-74, 230 Cal. Rptr.
at 145, 147-49.
58. /d. at 609-10, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
59. /d. (footnotes and citations omitted):
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that "[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right .
to have the
assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense ~ .. ·."60
The Supreme Court of Connecticut also rejected Burbine in State v.
Stoddard. 61 There, an attorney's telephone request to speak to a suspect
in custody was met with the false response that the suspect in fact was
not being held. Unaware that such efforts were being made on his behalf,
the defendant waived his Miranda rights and made an inculpatory
statement. 62
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that Burbine permitted the states to reach their own conclusions, and observed that
"[t]his· recognition, no doubt mandated in part by well known principles
of federalism; Michigan v. Long was also prompted by a reluctance to
intrude into the administration of state criminal processes." 63
Turning to its own constitution, the Stoddard court traced the history of the development of the right to counsel in Connecticut. Finding
that the Connecticut courts have long taken great care to assure the representation of the criminally accused, the court held that the police are
obligated to apprise a suspect promptly of efforts made by an attorney to
render assistance. 64 It predicated that conclusion upon the due process
clause of article 1, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution. 65
In summary, the question of whether to follow the Supreme Court's
holding in Burbine has confronted the appellate courts of a number of
states. The divergent results in these cases cannot be traced to the language of the particular state constitutional provisions at issue, as each
60. /d. at 600 n.2, 724 P.2d at 1167 n.2, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.2; see also CAL CONST.
art. I, § 15.
61. 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988).
62. /d. at 160-62, 537 A.2d at 449-50.
63. /d. at 164, 537 A.2d at 451 (citation omitted). In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), the Supreme Court discussed at length its own lack of jurisdiction where the
ruling of the state court below is predicated upon an adequate and independent
ground of state law. /d. at 1037-44. The Court held that it is empowered to hear a
case where the lower court clearly relied upon federal principles, or where the state
court's analysis could reasonably be construed as relying upon federal principles.
/d. at 1040-42. Conversely, where the lower court plainly relied upon rules of state
law, its holding is not subject to Supreme Court review unless the state law contravenes the United States Constitution. /d. Michigan v. Long is relevant to the subject of this article because it implies that a holding predicated upon a state
constitutional theory which confers greater protection upon a criminal defendant
than does the cognate provision of the United States Constitution is not subject to
review by the Supreme Court.
64. Stoddard, 206 Conn. at 166-67, 537 A.2d at 452.
65. Article 1, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution provides: "No person shall be
compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive
fines imposed." CONN. CONST., art. I, § 8.
Although Stoddard and Houston both rejected the rationale of Burbine, other
courts, over forceful dissents, have followed Burbine. See People v. Holland, 121 Ill.
2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987); State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1060 (1988).
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involved charter mandates in general terms that a defendant in a criminal
case shall have a right to counsel and a privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Instead, the divergence must be traced to a difference in
philosophy concerning the proper deference owed to the United States
Supreme Court.
III.

USE OF PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
TO STRIKE BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS

An important issue in federalism was created when the Supreme
Court responded to the tactic employed by some prosecutors of using
peremptory challenges to remove black prospective jurors, particularly in
cases involving a black defendant and a white victim, by initially refusing
to condemn that practice in any significant way. While some state
courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland, followed the lead of
the Supreme Court, others did not. The difference in approach is
instructive.
At the height of a very active period in the history of the American
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court decided Swain v. Alabama. 66
In Swain, the prosecutor removed all six black potential jurors through a
procedure equivalent to the peremptory challenge. 67 The defendant challenged this practice as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court,
however, rejected the challenge, reasoning that, historically, peremptory
challenges had provided trial counsel with an unfettered right to remove
prospective jurors without accounting for the motivations behind the removals. 68 The Court went on to note that counsel may properly use a
juror's group affiliation as a kind of shorthand for dividing the individual
characteristics of persons who under ordinary circumstances must be total strangers to the attorneys. 69 On the basis of this reasoning, the Swain
Court concluded that a defendant cannot establish unconstitutional racial discrimination on the basis of a single case. 70 Only when the prosecutor's office operated in a discriminatory manner in a series of cases
could a cognizable claim be established. 71
Subsequent to the Swain decision, developments under a different
constitutional theory began to cast doubt upon the continuing viability of
its holding. Under these decisions, the principle was established that the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury included a right to
66. 380 u.s. 202 (1965).
67. See id. at 210. At the time of this case, Alabama employed a "struck-jury system"
to impanel a petit jury. Under this system, the defense would strike two potential
jurors and the prosecution one, in alternating turns, until a large venire was reduced
to only twelve members. /d.
68. /d. at 212-22.
69. /d. at 220-21.
70. /d. at 222-28.
71. /d. at 227.
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trial by a jury drawn from a "fair cross-section" of the community. 72
The cases held that under the fair cross-section requirement, the states
were prohibited from systematically excluding any "cognizable group"
from jury service. 73 Therefore, if a state's system of drawing individuals
from the community for jury service had the effect of disproportionately
excluding groups such as blacks and women from the process, it contravened the Sixth Amendment.
·'
When the Supreme Court revisited the subject of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky, 14 it was natural to
expect that it would reconsider Swain and possibly overrule it on fair
cross-section grounds. Instead, .the Court departed from the fair crosssection grounds upon which it had granted certiorari and held in favor of
the defendant on an equal protection theory. 75 The Court ruled that
henceforth a defendant could establish an equal protection violation on
· the basis of a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a single case. 76
The question of federalism arose during the interim period between
Swain and Batson, when some state courts were called upon to decide
whether to afford greater protection to defendants than was provided by
Swain. People v. Wheeler, 77 is a particularly notable example of a state
court's reliance on a state constitution to resolve this issue. In Wheeler,
two black men were on trial for the murder of a white grocery store
owner. During the voir dire process, the prosecutor used his peremptory
challenges to remove all of the black prospective jurors. An all-white
jury convicted both defendants. 78
The defendants on appeal relied upon the right to an impartial jury
secured by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. 79 The
court, in a well considered opinion, found error largely on the basis of
fair cross-section cases, fashioned a remedy, and only then mentioned the
72. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
73. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-67; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
74. 476 u.s. 79 (1986).
75. The Court explained its decision by stating "that resolution of petitioner's claim
properly turns on application of equal protection principles .... " /d. at 84 n.4. This
decision is particularly suprising in light of the fact that the petitioner neither raised
nor briefed an equal protection argument. See id. at 111-18 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
76. /d. at 93-100. To implement its holding, the Court placed the initial burden upon
the defense to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination through an examination of, inter alia, the pattern of strikes exercised by the prosecutor and the respective races of the major trial participants. Id. at 96-98. In the event that a prima
facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to provide a specific, racially neutral explanation for his challenges. /d. at 97. It is then the responsibility of the trial judge to determine where the truth lies, and if necessary to
fashion an appropriate remedy. /d. at 98 & n.21.
77. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
78. Id. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
79. Id. at 265-66, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96. Article I, section 16 of the
California Constitution provides in relevant part: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right
and shall be secured to all .... " CAL CONST. art. I, § 16.
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Supreme Court case directly on point, Swain. Its attitude toward Swain
was revealed in the first sentence of its discussion .of that precedent:
"The People nevertheless contend that we are compelled to allow this
pernicious practice to continue in our courts by the case of Swain v. Alabama .... " 80 Rejecting that premise, the court went on to make clear
that it would never be "compelled" to follow any Supreme Court precedent that provided less protection for state citizens than did California
law:
Because a fundamental safeguard of the California Declaration
of Rights is at issue, however, 'our first referent is California
Law' and divergent decisions of the United State Supreme
Court 'are to be followed by California courts only when they
provide no less protection than is guaranteed by California
law.' ... It is apparent that Swain provides less protection to
California residents than the rule we now adopt. Under Swain
a defendant is barred from vindicating his right to an impartial
jury unless he can provide that over a long period of time the
same prosecutor has struck every black from every petit jury
'whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever
the defendant or the victim may be.'8 1
The Wheeler court expressly recognized that another path was open
to it-to distinguish Swain as an equal protection case while granting
relief on fair cross-section grounds, and thereby avoid a direct clash with
Supreme Court precedent. The court, however, rejected this course in
light of its belief that the contemporary Supreme Court would adhere to
Swain even in the face of a challenge based upon the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury. 82 Instead, it decided the case under its own
constitution. 83
A few months later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reached the same result in Commonwealth v. Soares. 84 The court relied
upon substantial scholarly commentary in noting that "[s]ince its release
in 1965, Swain has been the subject of extensive and biting criticism." 85
Finding Swain's burden of proof requirement to be unrealistic and unfair,
the court granted relief under article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights. In language quite similar· to article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts article provides:
And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (citation omitted).
/d. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (citations omitted).
/d. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
/d. at 285-87, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-10.
377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
/d. at 476-77 n.11, 387 N.E.2d 510 n.11.
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estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the
land. 86
The Soares court showed greater deference to the Supreme Court
than its California counterpart in Wheeler, and its language was more
temperate. 87 The result, however, was the same- a state court refused
to follow Swain in interpreting its own constitution.
Wheeler and Soares had already been decided when the issue of racial discrimination in peremptory challenges first came before the Maryland Court of Appeals. In Lawrence v. State, 88 all three black
prospective jurors were peremptorily stricken by the prosecutor. Defense
counsel objected, the trial court overruled the objection, and Lawrence
was convicted of first-degree murder. 89 In the court of appeals, the defense relied upon articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, cited Wheeler and Soares, and asked that the court decline to
follow Swain. The court, however, rejected this position by reasoning
that fair cross-section analysis antedated Swain by twenty years, and that
nothing in the cases requiring a representative jury involved the use of
peremptory challenges or in any way repudiated that decision. 90
In support of its conclusion that Swain remained the controlling
precedent, the court of appeals proceeded to quote at length from its
holding in Attorney General v. Waldron 91 concerning the relationship between the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal charters:
It is the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution which is here involved, where it provides in pertinent part:
'No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.' ... Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem
it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the
due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights . . . . It is, perhaps, because this State has no express
equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to
apply 'in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution,' ... so that 'decisions
of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.' . . . While it is true, as our later discussion will show, that the equal protection guaranties of
Article 24 and the fourteenth amendment are independent, capable of divergent effect, it is apparent that the two are so intertwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each
86 .. MASS. DECL. RTS., art. 12.
87. Compare Soares, 377 Mass. at 477 n.12, 387 N.E.2d at 510 & n.12 with Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
88. 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983).
89. /d. at 558-59, 457 A.2d at 1128.
90. /d. at 566, 457 A.2d at 1131.
91. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
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complementing the other. Because the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court are not only controlling as to our interpretation and application of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment but also persuasive as we undertake to
interpret Article 24, we first examine the currents of the federal
analysis prior to determining the impact of these Constitutional
guaranties in this case.

* * *

When evaluating an equal protection claim grounded on Article 24, we utilize in large measure the basic analysis provided
by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the like
provision contained in the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, when under the auspices of federal equal protection,
certain important private interests are vindicated by the High
Court through an active scrutiny of legislative classifications, it
is not surprising that most of the decisions of this Court reflect
the same trend. Although the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 are 'in pari materia,' and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the
other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a
violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other. 92
The court went on to dispose of the article 21 right to jury trial
contention in a similar fashion. Quoting from its decision in Stewart v.
State, 93 the court continued:
In Harris . .. we declared the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Maryland Constitution to be self-executing. . . . In Smith
v. State we discussed the interplay between the two constitutional provisions. We concluded 'that the opinions of the
Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial are "very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,'' as to the proper construction of Maryland's parallel
Article 21 right.' ... In Erbe ... however, we pointed out that
'[t]he language used in Art. 21 of our Declaration of Rights
relative to speedy trial is virtually identical with that in the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' 94
92. Lawrence, 295 Md. at 560-61, 457 A.2d at 1128-29 (citations omitted) (quoting
Waldron, 289 Md. at 714, 426 A.2d at 946). With respect to the similarity in interpretation between the Fourteenth Amendment and article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the court relied upon the following cases: United States
Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 395, 177 A.2d 903, 909 (1934), rev'd on
other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1937); Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee,
463 F. Supp. 957, 970 (D. Md. 1978); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal &
Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974).
93. 282 Md. 557, 386 A.2d 1206 (1978).
94. Lawrence, 295 Md. at 562, 457 A.2d at 1129 (quoting Stewart, 282 Md. at 570, 386
A.2d at 1206).
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The court proceeded to find that prosecutors are presumed to exercise peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and that the use
of strikes to remove all three black prospective jurors from the panel was
insufficient to rebut the presumption. Lawrence's conviction was therefore affirmed. 95
Two years later in Evans v. State, 96 the defense contention received a
more receptive hearing, but once again met with a negative result. In
Evans, the state utilized most of its ten challenges to remove black jurors.
The prosecutor, in response to defense counsel's objection, stated that
"[w]e struck on background, age, occupation, what we learned during
the voir dire at the bench and in open court. We did not strike on racial
grounds. " 97
The court on this occasion saw "considerable force" in Evans' argument that Swain was no longer controlling, but declined to decide the
question because it found the uncontroverted explanation by the prosecutor sufficient to rebut the defense contention. 98 The court also gave full
consideration to the Wheeler I Soares line of reasoning, and did so without
apparent disapproval and without lengthy quotation from in pari materia
cases. 99 It is therefore possible to discern some evolution in the court's
thinking, and to speculate that had Batson not come along the court
might eventually have distinguished Swain on fair cross-section grounds
or departed from it under the Maryland Constitution. The end result,
however, is that while some state courts were employing their own constitutions to reject a heavily-criticized federal precedent, the Maryland
Court of Appeals declined to do so.
IV.

THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The law of search and seizure has proved in recent years to be a
continuing source of friction between the state and federal courts. As
Warren Court precedents have given way in many cases to more prosecution-oriented decisions under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, state
95. /d. at 567-72, 457 A.2d at 1132-34. After Batson was decided, the court of appeals
viewed the matter much differently. For example, in Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50,
542 A.2d 1267 (1988), the court found that the appellant had demonstrated a prima
facie case of discrimination where the prosecutor had used one peremptory challenge to strike a black juror and bring about an all-white jury.
96. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985).
97. /d. at 524, 499 A.2d at 1280. In Stanley, the court of appeals made clear that after
Batson such an explanation would be insufficient, as the prosecutor is required to
provide a specific explanation for each challenge. Stanley, 313 Md. at 80, 88, 542
A.2d at 1271, 1281.
98. Evans, 304 Md. at 525-26, 499 A.2d at 1282.
99. /d. at 526-28, 499 A.2d at 1281-82. As noted by the court, other authorities have
also analyzed the issue in a manner inconsistent with Swain. See McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir. 1984) (Sixth Amendment forbids the prosecution from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of
race); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting Swain under the Florida
Constitution); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. App. 1980).
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courts have adhered to prior law through application of their own statutes, court rules, and constitutions. 100
Among the most important issues in this area is the definition of
"probable cause" - that is, when do police possess sufficient information
to justify the intrusion of an arrest or a search and seizure? Prior to
1983, the sufficiency of probable cause to obtain a warrant was judged by
the rules of Aguilar v. Texas 101 and Spinelli v. United States 102 ("AguilarSpinelli"). Under these cases, issuance of a warrant was justified only if
the issuing magistrate was satisfied of both the veracity of the informant
who provided the information to the police and the informant's basis of
knowledge of the reported information. 103 If either "prong" of this test
was unsatisfied, the warrant application failed to demonstrate sufficient
probable cause.
In Illinois v. Gates, 104 the Supreme Court rejected the AguilarSpinelli test, finding it insufficiently flexible. The Court substituted a "totality of the circumstances" approach, under which an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge remained relevant criteria but were no longer
essential to a finding of probable cause. 105
As the Aguilar-Spinel/i approach is more restrictive than that of
Gates, the states are free under their own laws to retain the older analysis.106 As with the aftermath of Burbine and Swain, state courts have
divided concerning their adherence to the federal precedent embodied in
Gates when interpreting their own constitutions.
The issue came before the Maryland Court of Appeals in Potts v.
State. 107 In Potts, a search of the defendant's residence was conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued prior to the Gates decision, but the matter
was not litigated until after the issuance of the opinion. Among the issues to be decided was whether the Maryland courts should reject Gates
altogether and apply a stricter test of probable cause under article 26 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 108 The court of appeals disposed of
that argument in familiar terms:
Article 26 and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution developed from the same historical background. . . . Accordingly, we have said on numerous occasions that Article 26
is in pari materia with its federal counterpart and decisions of
the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are entitled to great respect. Giving due regard to the reasoning in
100. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ l.3 (2d Ed. 1987); Wilkes, More on the
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975).
101. 378 u.s. 108 (1964).
102. 393 u.s. 410 (1969).
103. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15.
104. 462 u.s. 213 (1983).
105. /d. at 230-39.
106. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983); see also supra note 63.
107. 300 Md. 567, 479 A.2d 1335 (1984).
108. /d. at 576, 479 A.2d at 1340.
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Gates and Upton, we decline to adopt a probable cause standard
under Art. 26 which is different than that applied under the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the appropriate standard
for reviewing a magistrate's probable cause determination
under Art. 26 is the totality of the circumstances analysis as set
forth in Gates and Upton . ... 1o9

A completely different approach from that of the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Potts was taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Upton. 110 When Upton's case first reached
109. /d. (citations omitted). Unlike the unanimous decisions in the overwhelming majority of in pari materia cases, Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310,430 A.2d 49 (1981), upon
which the court relied, is interesting because it contained a dissent. In United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), the Supreme Court had recently overruled Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and abrogated the rule that an individual
charged with possession of an illegal substance has "automatic standing" to challenge the seizure of the contraband. In Gahan, the court of appeals was urged to
retain the automatic standing concept under article 26 of the Declaration of Rights.
Discussing the in pari materia precedents at length, the court rejected this position.
Gahan, 290 Md. at 319-22, 430 A.2d at 53-55.
Judge Davidson dissented. On the merits, she concluded that automatic standing was a sound rule that should be retained. The dissent's proposed solution was to
so hold under article 26:
I agree with the majority that 'Art. 26 is in pari materia with the
Fourth· Amendment' and that in considering Art. 26, 'decisions of the
Supreme Court on the kindred Fourth Amendment are entitled to great
respect.' . . . Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment and Art. 26 are independent and capable of divergent effect. Although decisions of the
Supreme Court are controlling when we interpret the Federal Constitution, they are only persuasive when we interpret the Maryland Declaration
of Rights ....
Under the circumstances here, I would adhere to this Court's rationale in [Duncan v. State, 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976)] and I would
hold that under Art. 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in cases
involving possessory offenses, an accused has 'automatic standing' and is
not required to establish affirmatively either a possessory interest in the
property seized or a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises
searched in order to have standing to challenge a search and seizure.
Gahan, 290 Md. at 331, 430 A.2d at 60 (Davidson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The Gates decision involved a search pursuant to a warrant. A related question
is whether the "totality of the circumstances" approach should also replace the
Aguilar-SpineIIi analysis in the context of a warrantless search and seizure. In Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1988), the court of appeals was urged to
reject the totality approach under both the federal and state constitutions in the
warrantless search and seizure context. The court held that Gates applies to warrantless searches as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, and brushed aside the state
constitutional argument in a footnote: "Article 26 is in pari materia with the fourth
amendment .... [citing Potts and Gahan]" Id. at 227 n.8, 550 A.2d at 673 n.8. The
court, however, did acknowledge that other state courts had rejected the Gates approach in the warrantless search and seizure context under their own constitutions.
Id. at 230-31 n.ll, 550 A.2d at 674-75 n.ll; see, e.g., State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn.
219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
110. 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983), rev'd, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
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Massachusetts' highest court, the tribunal found error in the denial of a
motion to suppress certain evidence for lack of probable cause to search
the mobile home where Upton had lived. The court reasoned that Gates
had worked a relatively minor modification of the Aguilar-Spinel/i analysis and had left it largely intact. 111
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.112 The Court chastised the Massachusetts court for misunderstanding its opinion in Gates, which it characterized as having
completely abolished the unrealistic and hypertechnical doctrine of Aguilar-Spinel/i.113
The Massachusetts court struck back. 114 Relying upon article 14 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 115 the court concluded that the
Gates standard was too imprecise and too permissive, and that it provided insufficient guidance to serve as a proper definition of probable
cause. 116 Accordingly, the Aguilar-Spinel/i analysis was reinstated. 117
In reaching this conclusion, the court described the relationship between the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts charter in
the following terms:
The Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States. In fact,
portions of the Constitution of the United States are based on
provisions in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and this
has been thought to be particularly true of the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and art. 14.... In particular
situations, on similar facts, we have reached different results
under the State Constitution from those that were reached by
the Supreme Court of the United States under the Federal Constitution. On occasion, the differences can be explained because
of different language in the two Constitutions. . . . On the other
hand, in deciding similar constitutional questions, the two
courts have reached contrary results based on differences of
opinion concerning the application of similar constitutional
/d. at 568, 458 N.E.2d at 720-21.
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
/d. at 732-33.
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their. property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MASS. DECL. RTs. art. XIV.
116. Upton, 394 Mass. at 370-74, 476 N.E.2d at 554-56.
117. Jd. at 374-77, 476 N.E.2d at 556-58.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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In other contexts as well, Supreme Court decisions in the search and
seizure area have been modified or rejected by jurisdictions other than
Maryland in the interest of insulating older principles from the Supreme
Court's conservatism. 119 Moreover, those courts taking a more independent stance have at times done so notwithstanding the nearly identical language of the Fourth Amendment and the cognate state
provision. 120
V.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The most recent instance in which the Maryland Court of Appeals
has been urged to deviate from Supreme Court precedent in construing
the Maryland Declaration of Rights involved the proper standard for
assessing the effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. State v.
Colvin 121 arose out of a defendant's collateral attack upon his conviction
and sentence of death in post-conviction proceedings. Among the issues
presented was whether Colvin had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu118. /d. at 372,476 N.E.2d at 555 (citations omitted). The court cited several Massachusetts cases that have reached results at odds with the Supreme Court. Compare Moe
v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) with Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (funding of medically necessary abortions); District
Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (constitutionality of the death penalty); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) with Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race). The court also noted other cases that could be
distinguished on the basis of differing language in the respective constitutions. Compare Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (1978) with Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (right to restrict free speech in places dispensing alcoholic beverages) and Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83,
445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights to seek signatures on private property in connection with ballot access) with
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no first amendment right to picket in a
privately owned shopping center).
119. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (right of privacy in records
of long-distance telephone calls recognized under New Jersey Constitution despite
lack of such right under Fourth Amendment); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673
(S.D. 1976) (inventory search found unreasonable under the South Dakota Constitution despite federal Supreme Court's ruling in the same case that search was
proper); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent to a search
found invalid under New Jersey Constitution despite Supreme Court precedent construing the Fourth Amendment to the contrary).
120. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (concluding that the state court is the final arbiter of its own law and may freely interpret that law in a manner more restrictive of the government than has the Supreme
Court despite nearly identical language between the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the cognate provision of the California
Constitution).
121. 314 Md. 1, 548 A.2d 506 (1988).
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tion and article 21 of the Declaration of Rights. 122
In analyzing the issue, the coart applied the two-part test announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 123 In
Strickland, the Supreme Court approached the issue by granting great
deference to trial counsel, with a concomitant refusal to use hindsight to
conclude that tactical decisions that were unsuccessful demonstrated
constitutionally inadequate performance. 124 The Strickland Court proceeded from this premise to hold that a defendant asserting ineffective
assistance must establish both a deficiency in counsel's performance and
resulting prejudice sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that,
absent counsel's errors, the result of the case would have been
different. 125
In Colvin, the defense urged the court of appeals to reject Strickland
and to hold trial counsel in capital cases to a higher standard. The court,
however, was not persuaded. Citing Lodowski II, 126 it concluded that
there is no distinction between the right to counsel provisions of the Sixth
Amendment and article 21 and therefore, the Strickland standard applied to both. 127
When the Supreme Court of Hawaii considered the same issue, it
arrived at a different conclusion. In State v. Smith, 128 that court noted
that the Strickland standard had been criticized because its prejudice
component erected a nearly insuperable barrier to ineffective assistance
claims. 129 It therefore rejected the prejudice requirement and held that
under article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution it would continue
to adhere to pre-Strickland Hawaii cases which focused upon counsel's
performance rather than upon prejudice to the defense case. 130
VI.

CRITIQUE OF THE IN PARI MATERIA APPROACH

· The foregoing discussion makes clear that state courts have divided
on the question of whether their own constitutions should be applied so
as to deviate from decisions of the Supreme Court with which they disagree. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has firmly taken the position
that Supreme Court precedent construing a provision of the United
States Constitution is virtually direct authority for interpretation of the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

ld. at 23-24, 548 A.2d at 517; see also text accompanying notes 1-2.
466 u.s. 668 (1984).
Id. at 689-91.
Id. at 687.
Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 37.
Colvin, 314 Md. at 24, 548 A.2d at 517.
712 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1986).
I d. at 500 n. 7.
ld. Similiarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has indicated that the
Massachusetts Constitution may require a different standard than Strickland's. The
court, however, found counsel's performance sufficiently competent that the matter
could remain open. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 635, 519 N.E.2d
245, 250 n.IO (1988).
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cognate provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As a result, a
court which has not hesitated to render controversial decisions in favor
of criminal defendants in other contexts 131 has declined to deviate from
federal precedent even where it is not persuaded that the particular holding is correct. The question that must be addressed is whether the in pari
materia approach can be justified.
In the course of a thorough analysis of the proper relationship between the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the states,
one commentator has written:
In our federal system, state constitutions have a significant role
to play as protectors of individual rights and liberties. This role
derives its character from the freedom of state courts to move
beyond the protections provided by federal doctrine and from
the distinctive character of state courts and state constitutions.
But the state constitutional role is also shaped by the emergence of the federal Bill of Rights in recent decades as the primary constitutional shield against intrusions by all levels of
government. The present function of state constitutions is as a
second line of defense for those rights protected by the federal
Constitution and as an independent source of supplemental
rights unrecognized by federallaw. 132
This commentator further provided and elaborated upon specific
justifications for rendering decisions under state charters that are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In broad terms, these justifications are: (1) perceived flaws in the Supreme Court's reasoning which
cause the state court to disagree with the result; (2) institutional differences between the state and federal governments; and (3) distinctive
131. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979) (dismissal sanction for
violation of 180-day "speedy trial" rule); Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d
709 (1978) (suppression of confession where a suspect's right to prompt presentment
before a judicial officer is violated); Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 539 A.2d 637
(1988) (death sentence); see also Huffington v. State, 295 Md. 1, 452 A.2d 1211
(1982) (same).
132. Comment, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1324, 1367 (1982) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Comment, Interpretation of
Rights]. This comment takes the position that state courts should show some deferrenee to the Supreme Court in constitutional matters, should proceed carefully to
fill in gaps left by Supreme Court decisions, and should carefully consider a number
of factors before deviating from Supreme Court holdings. The commentators, however, reject the in pari materia approach:
The duty to protect individual rights, a duty that both our federal structure and thei:· own constii:utions impose on the states, requires that state
courts not regard their constitutions as mere mirrors of federal
protections.
/d. at 1356 (foomote omitted). See generally Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation since 1980: A Judicial
Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1986); Symposium on the Revolution in
State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988); Symposium: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959 (1985).
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state-specific considerations such as the language of the state constitution, the state's history, established bodies of state law, and distinctive
attitudes of the state's citizens.I33
These factors weigh heavily in support of an interpretation of the
Maryland Constitution which is independent of Supreme Court precedent. As noted above, the court of appeals has at times found Supreme
Court holdings unconvincing. The court of appeals was expressly dissatisfied by the reasoning of Burbine, 134 and perceived great force in the
contention that the rule of Swain was outmoded. 135 By nevertheless following these holdings, the court has seemingly abdicated its frequently
reiterated authority to give independent effect to the Maryland
Constitution.
Furthermore, the language of the relevant provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights differs significantly from that of the cognate
federal provisions. For example, article 26 condemns improperly obtained warrants as "grievous and oppressive" and as "illegal;" however,
such terms do not appear in the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 136 Should the court of appeals desire to depart from the
Supreme Court's view that a "good-faith" execution of an improper warrant is constitutionally valid, 137 the difference in language between the
cognate provisions could provide a justification.
More to the point, however, is the argument that the citizens of
Maryland simply do not always share the prevailing views of the nation
as a whole. For example, while the nation has elected conservative
Republicans to the presidency in recent years, during the same period the
governors, senators, and representatives elected by Maryland voters have
overwhelmingly been affiliated with the Democratic Party. Any contention that the views of Supreme Court Justices appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush more accurately reflect the views of Maryland citizens
than do the ideas of court of appeals judges appointed by popularlyelected governors of Maryland is dubious at best. Yet the practical effect
of the in pari materia approach is to delegate to a conservative United
States Supreme Court the task of construing the Maryland Constitution.
An argument can be made, of course, that the in pari materia approach is appropriate. One possible benefit of the deference of a state
court to Supreme Court precedent is the promotion of uniformity and
predictability in the law. Given consistent deference, litigants or potential litigants can be confident that Supreme Court holdings will apply
equally in the state courts and can govern themselves accordingly.
Uniformity and consistency in the basic philosophical choices that
give life to a constitution, however, would not appear to be appropriate
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Comment, Interpretation of Rights, supra note 132, at 1359-61.
See supra notes 18-25, 31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66-71, 96-98 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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attributes of a federal system of government. The basic idea of federalism is that local governments are to be motivated by local concerns, and
are to enact, interpret, and enforce laws so as to best serve local needs.
In contrast, the national government exists to discern a consensus or synthesis from the variety of interests that motivate local governments, and
to enact and interpret laws for the common good. The concerns of some
localities in a diverse nation will frequently differ from those of other
localities as well as from those of the nation as a whole. A significant
shortcoming of the in pari materia approach is that instead of construing
a state constitution to reflect local conditions and traditions, the task of
interpretation is delegated to an authority whose views and concerns may
be entirely different. Such an approach raises the real question of why it
is necessary to have a state constitution at all. 138
Another possible justification for the in pari materia idea is the one
frequently expressed by the court of appeals - that the Federal Bill of
Rights and Maryland Declaration of Rights emerged from the same historical setting in response to the same problems. If social and economic
conditions were static in nature, that justification might carry a substantial amount of weight. It simply does not follow, however, that because
two constitutional provisions were enacted in response to similar
problems of the late eighteenth century, they should be construed in
lockstep as courts face the very different concerns of the late twentieth
century and beyond. While the drafters of the Fourth Amendment and
article 26 may well have had similar views concerning the general warrants employed by the British government, for example, that sqrely does
not bind their successors to think alike with regard to the propriety of
such innovations as video surveillance within a suspect's home. 139
Finally, the in pari materia approach disserves the goal of a wide
dissemination of conflicting ideas, to the end that superior ideas will displace outdated ones. The Supreme Court within its sphere may be
supreme, but it is not infallible. In a system of checks and balances
which provides few significant checks upon the nation's highest court,
138. Along the same lines, the doctrine of stare decisis is not appropriately invoked as a
justification for the granting of near-total deference. The Supreme Court has itself
noted that when dealing with an issue that is "substantially related to the constitutional sovereignty of the States," stare decisis plays a less important role than it does
in other contexts. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381
(1977). Moreover, any actual reliance by a potential litigant upon the tendency of
the court of appeals to follow Supreme Court precedent must be tempered by the
former court's repeated pronouncement that the provisions of the State Constitution
are "independent" and "capable of divergent effect." See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
139. More logical seems the view of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which
justified the independence of the state charter in part on the basis that it is older
than the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363,
476 N.E.2d 548 (1985); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text. When the
Maryland Constitution was first enacted, the United States Constitution did not yet
exist. See supra note 3.
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the willingness of state courts to disagree under their own constitutions
plays a vital role in the evolution of the rule of law in the United States.

